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DESCARTES ON THE EXTENSIONS 





In the so-called Conversation with Burman, a record of a lengthy discussion between 
Descartes and (most likely) the Dutch theological student, Frans Burman, Descartes is reported 
to have claimed that our thought does not occur “in an instant” (in instanti), but rather “perse-
veres through some time” (perseverare per aliquod tempus). When Burman objected that such a 
claim has the unwelcome implication that “our thought will be extended and divisible” (cogitatio 
nostra erit extensa et divisibilis), Descartes responded that though the thought is “extended and 
divisible with respect to duration, because its duration can be divided into parts,” nonetheless it 
 This commonly accepted title is not a translation of the Latin title of the manuscript in the Uni-
versity of Göttingen Library, which is: Responsiones Renati Des Cartes ad quasdam difficultates es 
meditationibus ejus, etc., ab ipso haustae (AT 5:46). In the text and notes, AT = C. Adam and P. Tan-
nery, eds., Œuvres de Descartes, nouvelle présentation,  vols. (Paris: J. Vrin, 964–74), cited by volume 
(-part) and page.
 The margin of the first page of the Latin text includes the comment that the manuscript is per 
Burmannum and that it was transcribed on April 0 648 cum Claubergio, that is, the then-Dutch student 
Johann Clauberg (AT 5:44–45). It is possible that the Burman is Frans Burman’s father, Peter Burman, 
who was a Protestant minister in Leyden. However, it is much more likely given the connection to the 
young Clauberg that his son was Descartes’s interviewer. The record of the interview that we now possess 
is based on an anonymous copy of Burman and Clauberg’s (lost) original.





is not “extended and divisible with respect to its nature, since it remains unextended” (AT 5:48). 
More precisely, Descartes’s view is that whereas the res cogitans that our thought modifies has 
an extended and divisible duration, it is a substance that remains by its nature unextended and 
indivisible. The clear contrast here is with body, which not only has an extended and divisible 
duration, but also is a substance that is extended and divisible by its nature as a res extensa. 
It may seem problematic to open a discussion of Descartes with a text that Descartes him-
self neither composed nor (as far as we know) reviewed, and that others have taken to be a not 
completely reliable source for his own views. Indeed, we will discover in due course that certain 
remarks immediately following the exchange concerning the duration of our thought that are 
attributed to him almost certainly do not reflect his own considered position. Nevertheless, 
I believe that this exchange is helpful in drawing attention to some significant complications for 
his conception of extension. These complications derive from the fact that there is in his system 
a fundamental distinction between a spatial extension that is divisible by its very nature and a 
temporal extension that though divisible in some sense, nonetheless can belong to a mind that 
is indivisible by its very nature. 
It is Descartes’s account of these two kinds of extension that I wish to consider here. 
I begin in § with spatial extension. In arguing against the existence of a vacuum in the material 
world, Descartes identifies the extension of space with the extension of corporeal substance. 
Contrary to a certain Spinozistic reading of his views that one finds in the literature, he also 
takes the extension of this substance to be divisible into indefinitely many distinct substantial 
parts. Nevertheless, Descartes also suggests at times that substantiality requires the possibil-
ity of separate existence, and in his own comments on the vacuum Spinoza exploits such a 
requirement in arguing for a monistic conception of the material world.  Considerations related 
to Spinoza’s argument reveal that in the end Descartes can avoid monism only be rejecting his 
own official position that the very same conceptions of the real distinction and substantiality 
govern the cases of divisible bodies and indivisible minds. 
 For challenges to the reliability of the Conversation, see the brief critical remarks in Ferdinand 
Alquié, ed., Œuvres philosophiques de Descartes (Paris: Garnier, 97), :765–68, as well as the more 
extensive argument in Roger Ariew, “The Infinite in Descartes’ Conversation with Burman,” Archiv für 
Geschichte der Philosophie 96 (987): 40–6. Cf. the remarks in note 8 concerning Ariew’s article.





For Descartes, divisibility into parts is not restricted to spatial extension. After all, he fa-
mously appeals in the Third Meditation to the fact that time is divisible into independent parts. 
However, I argue in § that the parts into which temporal extension is divisible are modal rather 
than substantial. Descartes does indicate that this extension is similar to spatial extension in be-
ing “indefinitely” divisible, that is to say, divisible into parts without limit. Whereas the derivation 
of indefinite divisibility from the nature of spatial extension is fairly straightforward, however, 
the derivation of this property is problematic in the case of temporal extension. In his summary 
of Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy, Spinoza offers on Descartes’s behalf an argument for 
the conclusion that such divisibility pertains to the duration of moving objects. This argument 
provides a reason for Descartes to resist the atomistic conception of temporal extension that 
some have attributed to him. Unfortunately, though, the argument also reveals the difficulty of 
justifying his claim that even the duration of thought must be indefinitely divisible. I conclude 
in §4 with a brief consideration of the relevance of this negative result for the view of the two 
extensions of space and time that Burman attributes to Descartes. 
2. Spatial Extension and Substantial Parts
A prominent feature of Descartes’s account of spatial extension is his denial that a vacuum 
in space is possible. In the second part of the Principles of Philosophy, he claims that since 
there can be no attributes of nothing, there cannot be a particular extension that no substance 
possesses. Thus, the extension of a space must belong to a substance. The conclusion is that “it 
is a contradiction to suppose that there is such a thing as a vacuum, that is, that in which there 
is nothing whatsoever” (PP II.6, AT 8-:49).4
Descartes’s argument here draws on the particular view of space he offers in the Princi-
ples.5 According to this view space or “internal place” is something that can be referred either to 
space or to a particular body. When it is referred to space, 
 PP = Principles of Philosophy, cited by part and article.
 Here I draw on, but also correct on matters of detail, the discussion of Descartes’s account of space 






we attribute to the extension only a generic unity [unitatem … genericam], so that when a 
new body occupies that space, the extension of the space is reckoned not to change, but 
rather to remain one and the same, so long as it retains the same size and shape and keeps 
the same position relative to certain external bodies that we use to determine that space. 
(AT 8-:45)6 
Space or place considered as having merely a “generic unity” count as a species of “exten-
sion considered in general” (extensio consideratur in genere) (PP II., AT 8-:46),7 which in Des-
cartes’s view is a mere “mode of thinking” under which particular created things are conceived, 
and not something that exists external to mind (see PP I.58, AT 8-:7).8 In contrast, when it 
is referred to body, internal place is “extension as something singular,” which we consider “as 
changing whenever there is a new body” (PP II.0, AT 8-:45). 
The result in Descartes that space considered specifically, with respect to a particular 
body, is not distinct from the extension of that body is in line with the account of place that is 
central to the rejection of the vacuum in Aristotle’s Physics. One argument in this text is that 
since place has three dimensions, it must itself be a body, and so there cannot be a place with-
out body, that is to say, a vacuum. 9 Descartes’s insistence that space considered generically 
can be distinguished from the extensions of particular bodies involves a qualification, present 
also in the work of the scholastics, of Aristotle’s identification of place with the surface of a 
 Descartes further distinguishes the generic internal place from “external place.” Whereas the for-
mer is the generic size and shape of a place, the latter is the surface surrounding what is in a particular 
place. This surface is a mode that is common to the body in that place and the bodies surrounding it, 
and is something that can be considered to remain the same even when the surrounded or surrounding 
bodies change (PP II.5, AT 8-:48).
 There is also a reference to extensionem in genere sumptam in PP II.8, AT 8-:50. 
 The passage states that anything consideratur in genere is a mode of thinking. As will become clear 
from the discussion below, however, Descartes’s view of the status of body considered in genere is more 
complicated than this passage suggests. 
  See Physics, bk. IV, chs. 6–9, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes (Princeton: Prin-
ceton University Press, 984), :6–69. 





particular body.0  Nonetheless, he endorses a core element of Aristotle’s view when he claims 
in the Principles that “the names ‘place’ and ‘space’ do not refer to anything distinct from the 
body which is said to be in a place, but refer only to its size, shape, and situation among other 
bodies” (PP II., AT 8-:47). Descartes therefore denies, with Aristotle, that extra-mental place 
and space are entities that exist over and above bodies and the features of their extension. 
Where Descartes goes beyond the standard Aristotelian position, of course, is in hold-
ing that body has a nature that is exhausted by the extension that it possesses. In his terms, 
extension in length, breadth and depth is a “principal attribute” that “constitutes the nature of 
corporeal substance” and to which all other properties of that substance “must be referred” (PP 
I.5, AT 8-:5). There is nothing more to body than its extension and the various shapes and 
motions that modify this extension.  Space is simply the consideration of the extension and its 
modifications in abstraction from the particular corporeal substance to which it belongs. 
A different, and perhaps more familiar, account of space was offered in the early modern 
period by Gassendi as well as by Newton and the Newtonians. On this account, space is not 
a mere abstraction, but is rather the immobile concrete container in which particular bodies 
move.  For Descartes, however, such a container is simply extension considered generically 
(generic extension), which is not an extra-mental entity but a mere mode of thinking. In contrast, 
extension considered specifically (specific extension) is a particular portion of extension that 
0 For this identification, see Physics, bk. IV, ch. 4, Complete Works, :58–6. For the distinction 
of generic space from body in Descartes, see Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 99), 4–6. On the scholastic background to the distinction of generic space 
from body, see Edward Grant, Much Ado About Nothing: Theories of space and the vacuum from the 
Middle Ages to the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 98), 4–9. For 
Descartes’s view of external place as the surface common to surrounded and surrounding bodies, see 
note 6.
 There is a detailed discussion of the relation between Descartes and the scholastics on space, 
quantity, and corporeal substance in Dennis Des Chene, Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late 
Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 996), ch. 9. 
 Grant discusses both the Gassendist position deriving from the Stoic view of Patrizi (Much Ado, 







moves with the body that possesses it (see PP II.0, AT 8-:45). It is such portions of specific 
extension that Descartes has in mind when he argues in the Principles that if a vacuum is any-
thing at all, it must be the extension of a particular part of space, from which it follows that it is 
simply the extension of a particular corporeal substance and thus not a space devoid of any such 
substance, that is to say, not a vacuum (see PP II.6, AT 8-:49).  
Descartes’s remarks concerning the vacuum broach the question whether he takes the 
portions of specific extension to constitute the nature of different corporeal substances, or 
whether for him it is only extension as a whole that constitutes the nature of a single corporeal 
substance. The former option requires a “pluralist” interpretation of his account of corporeal 
substance, according to which matter comprises a plurality of such substances. In contrast, the 
latter option indicates the sort of “monist” conception of corporeal substance that Spinoza fa-
mously defends in his Ethics. In the scholium to the fifteenth proposition in the first part of 
this text, Spinoza argues that since “corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, cannot be 
divided,” there can be only one such substance. He admits in this scholium that particular bod-
ies are divisible, but also insists that this is because such bodies are modes of substance rather 
than distinct substances. His conclusion is that though the modes of corporeal substance can 
be separated and divided, as well as generated and corrupted, corporeal substance itself is ab-
solutely indivisible, ingenerable and incorruptible (G :59).4
Martial Gueroult has urged that this Spinozistic view of corporeal substance in fact re-
flects Descartes’s own considered position. In his study of the first part of the Ethics, Gueroult 
appeals in particular to Descartes’s distinction in the Synopsis of the Meditations between 
“body taken in general” (corpus … in genere sumptum), which is a substance and therefore in-
corruptible, and particular bodies such as our own, which are subject to corruption since they 
are “made up of accidents” (AT 7:4). According to Gueroult, what we find here is precisely the 
 For more on Descartes’s account of space, see Roger Woolhouse, “Descartes and the Nature of 
Body (Principles of Philosophy, .4–9),” British Journal for the History of Philosophy  (994): 9–; 
Garber, Descartes Metaphysical Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 99), 4–6, 48–55; 
and Des Chene, Physiologia, 7–74. 
 G = G. Gerhardt, ed., Spinoza Opera, 4 vols. (Heidelberg: Carl Winters, 95), cited by volume 
and page.





Spinozistic distinction between “universal extended substance” and the particular bodies that 
are modal “determinations” of this substance.5 
Unfortunately for Gueroult’s interpretation, Descartes explicitly endorses the claim—
which Spinoza is concerned to reject in his scholium—that corporeal substance is divisible 
into parts that are themselves really distinct substances. Indeed, in the Principles Descartes 
illustrates the nature of a distinctio realis—that is, for him, a real distinction between two or 
more substances6—by noting that our idea of corporeal substance reveals that “if it exists, each 
and every part of it, as delimited in us by our thought, is really distinct from the other parts of 
the same substance” (PP I.60, AT 8-:8–9). Elsewhere Descartes indicates that his rejection 
of indivisible atoms in fact depends on the claim that every corporeal substance is divisible into 
parts that are themselves corporeal substances. In a letter to Gibieuf, for instance, he writes that 
the claim that there can be parts of matter that are indivisible is contradictory since “from the 
simple fact that I consider the two halves of a part of matter, however small it may be, as two 
complete substances, … I conclude with certainty that they are really divisible” (9 Jan. 64, AT 
:477). Here the parts of spatial extension—that is to say, of corporeal substance—are conceived 
not as modes of that extension, but rather as really distinct corporeal substances.
Descartes’s view that spatial parts are substances rather than modes is further reinforced 
by his claim in the Sixth Replies that the surface of a body “is merely a mode and hence cannot 
be a part of a substance. For body is a substance, and a mode cannot be a part of a substance” 
(AT 7:4). He explains that since surface has no depth, and thus is completely two-dimension-
 Martial Gueroult, Spinoza, I: Dieu (Ethique, I) (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 968), 54. Cf. Gueroult, 
Descartes selon l’ordre des raisons (Paris: Aubier, 95), :07–8. For defenses in the English-langua-
ge literature of various versions of the monistic reading of Descartes’s account of corporeal substance, see 
S. V. Keeling, Descartes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 968), 9–0; Bernard Williams, Descartes: 
The Project of Pure Inquiry (London: Penguin, 978), 6–9; John Cottingham, Descartes (London: 
Blackwell, 986), 84–88; Georges Dicker, Descartes: An Analytical and Historical Introduction (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 99), –7; and Thomas Lennon, “The Eleatic Descartes,” Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 45 (007). See also David J. Marshall, Jr., Prinzipien der Descartes: Exegese (Frei-
burg: Verlag Karl Alber, 979), 54–57. 
 As indicated in note 8, Descartes deviated on this point from the account of the real distinction in 






al, it cannot be a three-dimensional part of a body, but must be a mode of such a part.7 The clear 
indication, however, is that the three-dimensional parts are not themselves modes, but rather 
compose the substance of the body. Given this indication, Descartes clearly could not have ac-
cepted Spinoza’s position in the Ethics that a body can be conceived as a part only insofar as it 
is conceived as a mode of corporeal substance.
Descartes’s account of the difference between modes and parts is informed by a concep-
tion of substance that is prominent in the presentation more geometrico of the Meditations that 
he provides in the Second Replies. There Descartes defines substance as that “in which what-
ever we perceive immediately resides, as in a subject.” He offers as an illustration the fact that 
“the substance that is the immediate subject of local extension and of the accidents that presup-
pose extension, such as shape, position, local motion, and so on, is called body” (AT 7:6). The 
immediate subject of particular shapes or motions would seem to be not the whole of matter, 
but rather delimited parts of it. If so, then by this definition these parts, as well as the whole of 
matter that comprises all such parts, count as substances. 
To be sure, Descartes does allow that a mode can be the subject of further modes. For 
instance, he holds that motion can be the subject of the further modes of (scalar) speed and 
directional determination. When Hobbes protested that determination in particular cannot be 
in motion “as in a subject” given that motion is itself a mode, Descartes responded by insisting 
that “there is no awkwardness or absurdity in saying that an accident is the subject of another 
accident.” Yet he also cautioned that when he says that “motion is to its determination as a flat 
body is to its top or surface,” he means not that motion is like the body in being a substance, but 
merely that they are both “concrete things” rather than “abstractions” (see To Mersenne for Hob-
bes,  Apr. 64, AT :55–56). There remains a difference between the two concrete entities 
insofar as the flat body is the ultimate three-dimensional subject of its surface, whereas mo-
tion is a subject of determination that requires a further three-dimensional subject. Descartes’s 
response to Hobbes therefore is consistent with the non-Spinozistic distinction in the Sixth 
Replies between parts and modes. 
 For Descartes’s view that “external place” is such a mode, see note 6.





What then of the purportedly Spinozistic view in the Synopsis that Gueroult emphasiz-
es? An initial point is that it is not at all clear that by the talk in this text of corporeal substance 
“taken in general,” Descartes means matter taken in globo.8 In other passages that use similar 
terminology, Descartes has in mind delimited portions of spatial extension rather than spatial 
extension as a whole. In the Principles, for instance, Descartes indicates that “extension in 
general” consists not of the whole of extension, but rather of particular parts of space conceived 
generically.9 Moreover, in a 645 letter to the Jesuit Denis Mesland (hereafter, the Mesland let-
ter) he uses ‘a body in general’ (un corps en general) to mean not the whole of matter, but rather 
“a determined part” (une partie determinée) of it (9 Feb. 645, AT 4:66). 
For Descartes, however, there are some important differences in the ways in which ex-
tension or body can be considered in genere. We have seen that the Principles distinguishes 
generic extension as a mode of thinking from extra-mental specific extension. In contrast, the 
Mesland letter indicates that a body in general is precisely the extension of a body as it is 
physically realized in the material world. Given the definition in the Principles of ‘one body’ as 
“whatever is transferred at the same time” from contiguous bodies (PP II.5, AT 8-:54–55), this 
physical realization will involve the actual possession of a particular motion. Since motions can 
be gained or lost, the bodies-in-general of the Mesland letter are subject to change. Indeed, the 
emphasis in this letter is on the fact that such bodies are no longer numerically the same (idem 
numero) if any portion of them is removed (AT 4:66). 
That the “body taken in general” mentioned in the Synopsis is distinct from the corrupt-
ible parts of matter mentioned in the Mesland letter is clear from the stress in the former text 
on the fact that body in general, in contrast to the human body, is incorruptible. Moreover, it 
is interesting that when Descartes argues in the Principles for the real distinction of parts of 
 This consideration does not apply to all monistic interpretations of Descartes’s view of matter 
considered in general. It does not apply, for instance, to the interpretation in Lennon (see note 5), which 
identifies this matter with a subsisting essence rather than with spatial extension as a whole. Thanks to 
Joseph Zapeda for bringing this point to my attention.
 In PP II., Descartes offers as an example of “extension considered in general” the extension suc-
cessively occupied by a stone, wood, water, and air (AT 8-:46–47), whereas in PP II.8, he offers as an 
example of “extension taken in general” the interior of a vessel conceived as having no necessary connec-






matter, he focuses on the parts “as delimited in our thought” (a nobis cogitatione definitam) (PP 
I.60, AT 8-:8), rather than as actually individuated by motion.0 Likewise, in presenting the 
argument against atomism in the letter to Gibieuf, Descartes refers to his “consideration” (con-
sidere) of the two halves of the purported atom as complete substances. In contrast to the view 
in the Mesland letter of determinate material parts, then, the suggestion here is that the distinct 
substances that compose matter need not be individuated by some actual motion. Indeed, 
the indication is that the parts so individuated are composed of, as opposed to being identical 
to, the parts of extension that we can delimit in our thought. Though changes in accidents can 
bring about the destruction of the parts that are individuated by motion, no such changes can 
destroy any portion of the extension that composes the parts. Such portions therefore share 
with minds the property of being naturally incorruptible.  
The emphasis on the fact that incorruptible body is delimited by our thought may seem 
to indicate that it is the same as the generic extension mentioned in the Principles. However, 
the Synopsis is referring not to a mere mode of thinking, but rather to an incorruptible specific 
extension that at different times can compose different corruptible bodies (the bodies-in-gen-
eral of the Mesland letter). Each portion of this extra-mental extension that we pick out in 
thought constitutes a corporeal substance. In contrast to the determinate bodies individuated 
by motion, these substances are individuated by means not of relations to other objects, but 
rather of something intrinsic to the substances, namely, the portion of specific extension that 
is essential to them.
0 For this point, see Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics, 76. Cf. the discussion in Edward 
Slowik, “Descartes and Individual Corporeal Substance,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 
(00): –5.
 For the point that material substances are not the same for Descartes as the particular bodies he 
considers in his physics, see Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics, 76. 
 Cf. the reading of the Synopsis passage defended in Matthew Stuart, “Descartes’s Extended Subs-
tance,” in R. J. Gennaro and C. Huenemann, eds., New Essays on the Rationalists (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 999), esp. 9– 0. Stuart’s conclusion that “Descartes identifies extended substances 
with quantities of matter” (ibid., 99) is similar to my own. However, Stuart does not consider the Spino-
zistic objection, which I address presently, that quantities of matter cannot be substances that are really 
distinct from each other since they cannot exist apart from each other.
 





The “body in general” of the Synopsis thus can be positioned between the “extension in 
general” of the Principles and “a body in general” of the Mesland letter. Body in the Synopsis 
shares with the extension of the Principles the fact that it does not depend for its identity on a 
certain kind of actual motion, and thus is distinguishable from the body in general in the Mes-
land letter. Yet the body of the Synopsis is also similar to the body of the Mesland letter in pos-
sessing a specific extension that can exist apart from thought. Both are therefore distinct from 
the generic extension of the Principles, which is a mere mental entity that is individuated by 
thought. In the Synopsis, then, Descartes attempts to make room for parts of matter that have 
an extra-mental existence but that differ from the particular bodies that that are individuated, 
and can be corrupted, by motion (see Table ). 
	 Principles Synopsis Mesland letter
 extensio consideratur in genere corpus in genere sumptum un corps en general
 generic extension specific extension specific extension
 mode of thinking extra-mental extra-mental
 individuated by thought individuated by extension individuated by motion
  incorruptible corruptible
Table 
 In De ipsa natura (698), Leibniz objected that since no portion of extension can be distinguished 
from any other portion that is qualitatively indistinguishable from it, bodies cannot be individuated in 
terms of extension alone (see G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, ed. R. Ariew and D. Garber [India-
napolis: Hackett, 989], 6–65). However, my suggestion on Descartes’s behalf is that different portions 
of specific extension can be distinguished merely by the fact that they individuate distinct corporeal 
substances. Even if we could not distinguish qualitatively indistinguishable portions of specific exten-
sion, God could know which portion goes with which corporeal substance. For a similar suggestion, in 
response to Garber’s defense of Leibniz’s objection (in Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics, 8), see Des 






I suspect that Descartes concluded that parts of matter are distinct substances primarily 
on the basis of the fact that he took them to be distinguishable three-dimensional subjects 
of modes that are themselves incorruptible.4 However, there is a problem for this conclusion 
that Descartes seems not to have confronted, but that Spinoza emphasizes. The relevant text is 
again found in the scholium to Ethics Ip5, and in particular in the remarks there concerning 
the vacuum. Spinoza argues that those who reject the possibility of a vacuum must grant that 
matter cannot be composed of really distinct parts. For in the case of “things which are really 
distinct from one another, one can be, and remain in its condition, without the other.” If the 
parts of matter were really distinct in this sense, however, one part could “be annihilated, the 
rest remaining connected as before,” thus creating a vacuum. Since in fact all the parts of matter 
“must so concur that there is no vacuum,” these parts cannot be really distinct (G :59).
Descartes himself allows for the logical possibility that God can annihilate a portion of 
matter. However, his claim is that if God were to do this, then the surrounding bodies would 
have to come into contact (PP II.8, AT 8-:50). Moreover, in correspondence with More, Des-
cartes added that in the case of this sort of annihilation other bodies would have to move to 
replace the annihilated body (To More, 5 Feb. 649, AT 5:7–7).5 So Descartes, at least, would 
deny the possibility—which for Spinoza carries with it the possibility of a vacuum—that a body 
be annihilated with “the rest being connected as before.” 
Even if Descartes can sidestep the problem of the vacuum, however, the possibility of the 
annihilation of matter introduces a new problem for his claim that the parts of matter are really 
distinct. The problem here derives from the fact that the incorruptible parts of matter mentioned 
in the Synopsis seem to depend on the material parts that compose them.6 In the case of the 
 Descartes speaks at times as if even corruptible subjects of bodily modes, such as a stone (AT 7:44), 
a hand (AT 7:), or pieces of clothing (AT 7:44), are themselves substances. However, we could take 
his view to be that these subjects are substantial only in the sense that they are composed of more basic 
subjects that are themselves substances in a strict sense that entails incorruptibility. This move would be 
required, in any case, to accommodate the view in the Synopsis. See the discussion of this point in Stuart, 
“Descartes’s Extended Substance,” 99–0. 
 I am indebted here to the discussion of Descartes’s account of bodily annihilation in Joseph Zape-
da, “Spinoza’s Vacuum Argument Revisited.”
 In contrast, Spinoza was more concerned with the problem of the dependence of a part of matter 





composing parts, there may well be no problem with claiming that one such part can continue 
to exist even in the case where God annihilates another such part. However, it seems that the 
whole that includes the annihilated part cannot survive the annihilation, since the extension 
that individuates the whole is simply the sum (or, to use a current metaphysical term of art, the 
“fusion”) of the extensions that individuate its parts.
The question now is whether this whole could be something really distinct from the parts 
that compose it. The answer to this question depends on a crucial ambiguity in Descartes’s re-
marks concerning the distinctio realis, that is, the real distinction between different substances. 
The account of this distinction in the Principles begins with the claim that substances are really 
distinct just in case “we can clearly and distinctly understand one apart from the other” (PP I.60, 
AT 8-:8). On one reading, the claim is that we can so understand one to be a subject of prop-
erties that differs from other subjects. This reading seems to be confirmed by the appeal in this 
passage to the fact that he can think of each part of corporeal substance as the subject of certain 
modes of extension that differs from subjects of other modes of extension. On this reading, it 
seems that we can think of the whole as really distinct from the parts that compose it, since the 
whole and its parts can be conceived as distinguishable subjects.
However, the passage from the Principles continues by noting that if substances are re-
ally distinct, then God has the power “of separating them, or keeping one in being without the 
other” (AT 8-:9). Likewise, in the geometrical presentation of the Meditations in the Second 
Replies, Descartes includes in his set of definitions the claim that “two substances are said to be 
really distinguished when each of them can exist apart” (AT 7:6). The indication in these pas-
sages, it seems, is that the real distinction requires not only the understanding of the substances 
as separate subjects, but also the understanding that they can exist without other created sub-
stances. On this stronger reading of the real distinction, the whole cannot be conceived to be 
really distinct from its parts, since it cannot exist in separation from them.
The context of Descartes’s theory of distinctions helps to explain why he tended to speak 
as if the real distinction requires separable existence. In the Principles, he offers, in addition to 
the distinctio realis we have considered, a distinctio modalis between a mode and the substance it 






modifies,7 as well as a distinctio rationis between a substance and some attribute without which 
it cannot exist (PP I.60–6, AT 8-:8–0). This set of distinctions is not original to Descartes, but 
can be found in the earlier work of the scholastic Francisco Suárez. In his massive Disputationes 
Metaphysicae (597), Suárez uses the same terms to denote a distinction of res from res (distinc-
tio realis), of res from a modus of that res (distinctio modalis), and of two ways of conceiving one 
and the same res (distinctio rationis).8  The notion of a modal distinction is in fact one of Suárez’s 
distinctive contributions to modern philosophy, as is his view that the three kinds of distinctions 
can be understood in terms of separable existence. Whereas for him there is mutual separability 
in the case of really distinct res, there is only a one-way separability of a res from its mode, and a 
mutual inseparability in the case of entities that are distinct merely “in reason.”9 
Descartes is clear on the necessity of mutual separability in the case where the distinct 
substances have different kinds of attributes. Thus, he emphasizes in the Sixth Meditation that 
it follows from the fact that mind and body are really distinct substances that his mind can ex-
ist without his body (AT 7:78). 0 But Descartes also seems to be committed to the necessity of 
 As indicated below, Descartes allows that this sort of distinction holds between modes of the same 
substance (PP I.6, AT 8-:9–0). However, he indicates that this case counts as a modal distinction only 
because both modes are inseparable from the same substance. He notes that in the case where the modes 
belong to really distinct substances, the distinction between them is more properly a real than a modal 
one (AT 8-:0). 
 See Suárez, Disputationes Metaphysicae (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 965), disp. VII, §, :50–74. 
There is an English translation of this Disputation in C. Vollert, trans,, On the Various Kinds of Distinc-
tions (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 947). Whereas Suárez allowed for a real distinction be-
tween corporeal substances, on the one hand, and their substantial forms and real qualities, on the other, 
Descartes insisted that any mutable feature of body can be only modally and not really distinct from such 
a substance (see, for instance, To Mersenne, 6 Apr. 64, AT :649).
 On the distinctive nature of Suárez’s theory of distinctions in the context of scholastic thought, see 
Stephen Menn, “Suárez, Nominalism, and Modes,” in Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery, ed. K. 
White (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press of America, 997), 6–56. Menn indicates in parti-
cular how Suárez’s theory of modes distinguishes him from other realist and nominalist scholastics, who 
agreed on the point that the real and rational distinctions are exhaustive. 
0 For more on the issue of separability and its relation to Descartes’s argument for mind-body dis-
tinctness, see Marleen Rozemond, Descartes’s Dualism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 





separability in the case of the real distinction of two created substances that share the attribute 
of thought. For surely he would conclude from the fact that two finite minds are really distinct 
that each can exist without the other. After all, he holds in the Sixth Meditation that a mind is 
“single and complete on its own” (AT 7:85–86), and so presumably can exist on its own apart 
not only from body, but also from other created minds. 
However, this argument for the necessity of separability for the real distinction cannot 
apply to bodies. Indeed, in the Sixth Meditation passage just cited, Descartes takes the fact 
that minds are single and complete on their own to distinguish them from bodies, insofar as 
the latter are divisible into parts by their very nature (AT 7:86). No portion of specific extension 
can be single and complete apart from all other created substances, since all such portions are 
composed of distinct substantial parts from which they cannot exist in separation. 
In order to hold that each portion of specific extension is a substance that is really distinct 
from the parts that compose it, then, Descartes must employ a concept of the real distinction 
that, in contrast to the concept that applies to the case of created minds, does not require the 
possibility of existence apart from all other substances of the same type. But this difference in 
the understanding of the real distinction carries with it a difference in the concepts of substance 
that apply to minds and bodies. In the Principles, Descartes famously allows that the term 
‘substantia’ does not apply univocally in all cases. In particular, he argues there that the term 
998), ch. , esp. 8–5. However, Rozemond is most interested in the claim that separability constitutes 
the real distinction, and does not address the question of whether there can be a real distinction that does 
not involve separable existence. 
 Descartes denies, however, that finite minds can exist apart from God’s infinite mind. This denial 
reflects his position, to be considered below, that the term ‘substance’ does not apply univocally to God 
and creatures.
 Cf. Calvin Normore’s claim that the strong notion of the real distinction allows for the dependence 
of a particular part of matter on the rest of indefinitely large matter since “there is no particular indefini-
tely large extension” that this part requires; “any will do” (“Descartes on the Metaphysics of Extension,” in 
J. Carriero and J. Broughton, eds., A Companion to Descartes [Malden, MA-Oxford: Blackwell, 008], 
8). However, Normore also allows that for Descartes individual quantities of matter “are essentially 
dependent upon the very parts that they have” (ibid.), and it is this point that I take to create a difficulty 






cannot apply in the same way to God and creatures since God is a substance in the sense of 
depending on nothing else, whereas creatures cannot be substances in this sense given that 
they depend for their existence “on the work of the concursus of God” (PP I.5, AT 8-:4). 
Nevertheless, he continues by affirming that the term “applies univocally to mind and body” 
since both “need only the concursus of God to exist” (PP I.5, AT 8-:4–5). Descartes can 
allow that the substantial parts of spatial extension share with finite minds the property of 
depending only on God’s concurrence for existence, and thus of being naturally incorrupt-
ible. However, it seems that he must admit some fundamental difference between the kinds 
of substantiality involved in the two cases given his view of the “complete difference” between 
mind and body. Whereas the mind is indivisible, and so single and complete on its own, body 
is by its nature divisible into distinct and naturally incorruptible parts, and so cannot exist on 
its own apart from those parts.4 In order to accommodate this difference, Descartes needs 
to admit that the substantiality of bodily parts, unlike the substantiality of minds, does not 
require the possibility of existence apart from any other created substance. It turns out, then, 
that ‘substance’ cannot apply univocally to mind and body given the idiosyncratic nature of the 
spatial extension he posits.5
 For further discussion of Descartes’s account of God’s concursus, see ch.  of my Descartes on 
Causation (New York: Oxford University Press, 008).
 Interestingly, Descartes himself notes in the Principles that “it is easier for us to have an unders-
tanding of extended substance or thinking substance than it is for us to understand substance on its 
own, leaving out the fact that it thinks or is extended” (PP II.6, AT 8-:). What he did not recognize, 
however, it that this difficulty may be due in part to the fact that the substantiality of res extensa differs in 
some fundamental respects from the substantiality of res cogitans. 
 Spinoza, of course, would reject such a non-univocal understanding of substance, and insist that 
any substance, including extended substance, must be “single and complete” in a manner that precludes 
substantial divisibility; see Ethics Ipd, G :55.





3. Temporal Extension and Modal Parts
In the course of arguing in the Third Meditation that he could not exist if God did not, 
Descartes claims that since
the whole time of life can be divided into innumerable parts [innumeras partes], each single 
one of which depends in no way on the remaining, from the fact that I was shortly before, 
it does not follow that I must be now, unless some cause as it were creates me anew at this 
moment [me quasi rursus creet ad hoc momentum], that is conserves me. (AT 7:49) 
We will return later to Descartes’s conclusion that there must be some cause that con-
serves him at each moment he exists. What is most relevant for the moment is the view of “the 
nature of time” from which this conclusion is derived, and in particular the claim that time is 
divisible into “innumerable parts,” each of which is independent of the others. 
In order to understand this claim, we must start with Descartes’s official account of time 
in the Principles. There he holds that when time is considered in general, apart from the dura-
tion of particular objects, it is just a “mode of thinking” (PP I.57, AT 8-:6–7). As in the case 
of extension considered in general, so time considered in general is a mere abstraction. By the 
same token, just as extension considered specifically is identical to the extension of a corporeal 
substance, so time considered as existing in objects is identical to the duration of those objects, 
which is to be identified in turn with the enduring object. In technical terminology that he bor-
rowed from the scholastics, Descartes expresses this as the point that duration is distinct only 
“in reason,” and not really or modally, from the substance to which it is attributed. He takes this 
point to follow from the fact that we cannot distinctly understand an enduring substance apart 
from its duration, and also cannot so understand the duration, as it exists in the substance, apart 
from the substance itself (PP I.6, AT 8-:0).6
 For the claim in Suárez that there is merely a distinctio rationis between duration and the existing object, 
see his Disputationes, disp. L, §, ¶5, :94. Geoffrey Gorham, in “Descartes on Time and Duration,” Early Sci-
ence and Medicine  (007): 8–54, offers a similar account to the one provided here of the distinction in Des-
cartes between time and duration. Gorham cites the work of other commentators who take Descartes to hold 
that duration as well as time is something that is merely ideal or mind-dependent. See, for instance, Clarence 






So much for time and duration. What about their parts? If the parts are conceived in the 
same manner as Descartes conceives of the parts of spatial extension, then temporal extension 
must be composed of distinct substantial parts. However, such a conception leaves us with the 
strange result that all temporal substances are composed of distinct substantial time-slices. For 
when it is considered in objects, time is nothing other than a duration that is distinct only in rea-
son from the enduring substance. And if the duration is composed of distinct substantial parts, 
the substance itself must be composed of distinct substantial parts over time, just as extended 
substance is composed of distinct substantial parts at any time. 
There is reason to think that this result would be unacceptable for Descartes. In the pas-
sage from the Third Meditation concerning the nature of time, he considers his own temporal 
duration as a thinking thing. Yet we have seen Descartes’s insistence in the Sixth Meditation 
that the mind is completely indivisible. His conclusion there that “it is one and the same mind 
that wills, that senses, that understands” (AT 7:86) seems to hold not only at any particular point 
in time, but also over time. 
Nevertheless, one might object that whether Descartes likes it or not, his remarks in the 
Third Meditation commit him to the conclusion that different temporal parts of his mind con-
stitutes distinct substances. For the suggestion in this text is that God can create each part on 
its own, separate from the other parts. Given the view in Descartes, which he borrowed from 
Suárez, that mutual separability is sufficient for a real distinction, it seems to follow that the dif-
ferent temporal parts of his mind are really distinct substances.7
We can respond to this line of objection by drawing on the claim in the Conversation 
that even though the mind is divisible with respect to its duration, still it is indivisible with re-
spect to its nature. Thus the mind that exists at one time has the same indivisible nature that it 
has when it exists at another time. What allows for the substantial divisibility of body, however, 
is the fact that the distinct bodily parts have different natures. In the terms of the Conversation 
passage, body is extended and divisible with respect to its nature. Thus a bodily part individuat-
ed by a particular portion of specific spatial extension has a nature distinct from that of another 
bodily part that is individuated by a different portion of that extension. Whereas the distinction 
 Thanks to Dan Garber for pressing me on this point.





between the parts of spatial extension requires that the parts have different substantial natures, 
then, the distinction between the parts of temporal extension allows for the persistence of an 
object with the same substantial nature.8 
If the temporal duration of mind is not divisible into substantial parts, however, into what 
sort of parts can it be divided? We have noted that Descartes borrowed from Suárez the view that 
there are only three sorts of ontological distinctions, namely, real, modal and merely rational.9 We 
have ruled out the claim that the temporal duration of the mind is subject to the sort of divisibility 
into really distinct substantial parts that derives from the nature of spatial extension. But a merely 
rational distinction would not yield temporal parts truly independent of each other given Des-
cartes’s view that we cannot distinctly understand as separate what is distinct only in this manner 
(PP I.6, AT 8-:0). By default, then, the distinction among these parts must be a modal one. 
Descartes indicates that a modal distinction holds between two modes of the same sub-
stance, since “we can know one mode without the other, and vice versa, but neither however 
without the same substance in which they inhere” (PP I.6, AT 8-:9). My proposal, then, is 
that he takes the different parts of the duration of a substance to be modally distinct from each 
other. An immediate counterexample to this proposal may seem to be provided by Descartes’s 
claim in the Principles that “in created things, that which never has in itself diverse modes, 
such as existence and duration in the thing existing and enduring, must be called not qualities 
or modes but attributes” (PP I.56, AT 8-:6). However, we need to remember his position that 
thought and extension also are attributes that are not subject to modification considered as such. 
As he notes in an important correspondence with Arnauld (to which we will return): 
as extension, which constitutes the nature of body, differs greatly from various shapes or 
modes of extension that it assumes, so thought, or thinking nature, in which I take the es-
sence of the human mind to consist, is very different from this or that act of thinking … It 
 There is the Spinozistic objection that the different parts of body have the same nature as res 
extensa, and so cannot constitute distinct substantial parts. However, the suggestion in Descartes is that 
whereas the nature of all bodies consists in extension, different bodily parts nonetheless are distinct ulti-
mate subjects of bodily qualities, and so can be considered to have distinct substantial natures.






depends on the mind itself whether it elicits this or that particular mode of thinking, not 
however that it is a thinking thing. (9 July 648, AT 5:)
In the similar way, Descartes could say that invariable duration differs greatly from 
the particular modes that it has at different moments. Just as Descartes can distinguish the 
continuing attributes of thought and extension from the varying modes that it assumes, so, it 
seems, he can distinguish the duration of thinking and extended substances from its modally 
distinct parts.
However, it might seem that a modal distinction does not provide the sort of difference 
between temporal parts that the account of time in the Third Meditation requires. After all, the 
fact that a mind can be modified by different thoughts at the same time cannot suffice to show 
that it has distinct parts.40 So how could it follow from the fact that the duration of that mind 
can be modified in different ways that that duration has distinct parts?4 
The answer is that the different portions of my duration count as distinct temporal parts 
simply in virtue of the fact that by their very nature they cannot be simultaneous. It is because 
they cannot occur at once that it is possible that I endure at one time without enduring at other 
times. This sort of distinction of parts does not apply to the case of different modes that can exist 
at the same time. Thus, it doesn’t follow simply from the fact that a mind has different modes 
that it is divisible into modal parts. What is required further is that it has an extended duration 
composed of non-simultaneous portions. Such a duration has distinct modal parts insofar as 
endurance through one of the parts does not require endurance through the other parts. 
To say that the duration of a substance is divisible, then, is just to say that its attribute of 
duration can take on different modes at different non-overlapping times. But this sort of divis-
ibility does not preclude the substantial indivisibility of the thinking substance from which 
this attribute differs only “in reason.” And even though extended substance is divisible into 
0 In the Conversation, Descartes is reported as holding that he can have more than one thought at 
the same time, as when he simultaneously has the thought that he is talking and the thought that he is 
eating (AT 5:48).
 Thanks to Alison Simmons for suggesting this line of objection.





substantial parts, the divisibility of its duration does not introduce any additional division of its 
substance. As in the case of mind, so in the case of body there is only a modal distinction among 
the various parts of its duration.
Thus, I take the distinction in the Conversation between divisibility in duration and di-
visibility by nature to reflect the considered view in Descartes that different kinds of divisibility 
are involved in the cases of spatial and temporal extension. However, I alluded at the outset to 
difficulties concerning the account of duration attributed to Descartes in this text. These difficul-
ties derive from the recorded claim that just as the duration of our indivisible mind is itself di-
visible, so it is with the duration of God: “we can divide his duration into infinite parts [infinitas 
partes], even though God himself is not divisible.” When Burman objected that divine eternity is 
“altogether and at once” (simul et semel), Descartes is said to have responded that God’s dura-
tion “is not altogether and at once insofar as he exists altogether, for since we can distinguish in 
him now parts after the creation of the world, why can we not also distinguish it before then, 
when this is the same duration?” (AT 5:48–49).
There is reason to question the reliability of this particular report given the indication in 
Descartes’s own writings that he accepted the traditional conclusion that the duration of God 
is “altogether and at once.”4 Thus, he claims in the Principles that in the case of God there is 
“always the same and simple action by which he at once [simul] knows, wills and accomplishes 
everything” (PP I., AT 8-:4). Moreover, shortly after his meeting with Burman, Descartes in-
sists in correspondence that it involves “a contradiction to conceive of any duration intervening 
between the destruction of an earlier world and the creation of a new one,” and that “if we refer 
this duration to a succession in divine cognition or something similar, this would be an error of 
the intellect, not a true perception of anything” (To More, 5 Apr. 649, AT 5:4).4 
On my reading of his account of temporal duration, Descartes has good reason to reject 
the claims concerning divine duration that Burman attributes to him. For on that reading, the 
divisibility of the duration of our mind requires a diversity of modes in us. But Descartes makes 
 Here I oppose Gorham’s conclusion that this passage from the Conversation reflects Descartes’s 
most considered position; see “Descartes on Time and Duration,” 47–49. 
 See also Descartes’s claim in his 648 correspondence with Arnauld, considered below, that the 






clear in the Principles that “we properly say that there are in God not modes or qualities but 
only attributes since no variation in him is intelligible” (PP I.6, AT 8-:6). God simply cannot 
have the sort of modal diversity that would be required to conceive of his duration as divisible 
into modally distinct parts.
There is a more subtle difficulty, however, that concerns Burman’s attribution to Des-
cartes of the claim that our duration is divisible into “infinite parts.” Descartes was notoriously 
reticent to apply the notion of infinity to the division of extension, preferring instead to speak 
of an “indefinite” divisibility that has no limits we can conceive (see, for instance, PP I.6–7, 
AT 8-:4–5). Indeed, when discussing the divisibility of his life in the Third Meditation, he 
was careful to refer to a division into “innumerable,” as opposed to infinitely, many parts. God’s 
simplicity precludes the division of his duration into any distinct parts, much less an infinity of 
them. However, even in our case the most we can say, according to Descartes’s official position, 
is that we cannot conceive any limit to the divisibility of our duration. 44
There remains some question concerning the justification within Descartes’s system for 
even this more cautious claim. In the case of spatial extension, the inconceivability of any limit 
to division follows fairly directly from his argument for the impossibility of atoms. The argument 
in the Principles appeals to the fact that any part of matter, no matter how small, must have 
some sort of extension that we can divide at least “in thought” (PP II.0, AT 8-:5). What is 
less clear is why Descartes must reject the very conceivability of indivisible portions of temporal 
extension. Indeed, there is the claim in the literature, which Gueroult has developed with the 
 In order to illustrate the problematic nature of the view of infinity that Burman attributes to Des-
cartes, Ariew emphasizes that Descartes’s reported comment on the Third Meditation that “the infinite 
is the same as the indefinite multiplied” (AT 5:54) conflicts with the insistence in this very text that an 
indefinite increase in perfection is distinct in kind from actually infinite perfection (AT 7:47; see Ariew, 
“The Infinite in Descartes’ Conversation,” 59–6). I agree with Ariew that this conflict prevents us from 
trusting that portion of the Burman report in the way in which other commentators have done. Neverthe-
less, it must also be said that the precise nature of the infinite/indefinite distinction is not entirely clear in 
Descartes’s own writings. For documentation of this point, see Margaret Wilson, “Can I Be the Cause of 
My Idea of the World? (Descartes on the Infinite and Indefinite),” in A. Rorty, ed., Essays on Descartes’ 
Meditations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 986), 9–58. For evidence that Descartes did not 
always observe this distinction, see notes 5 and 5.





greatest care, that he actually understands this sort of extension to be a discontinuous collec-
tion of indivisible parts.45 In particular, Gueroult argues that Descartes takes as primary “the 
point of view of creation and of the concrete,” from which time must be conceived as a “repeti-
tion of indivisible and discontinuous creative instants.”46 In Gueroult’s view, then, the time that 
Descartes posits differs from spatial extension insofar as it is divisible ultimately into indivisible 
atemporal instants.
The debate in the literature over Gueroult’s interpretation has tended to emphasize the 
technical issue of whether Descartes took durationless instants to be boundaries of extended 
temporal parts rather than distinct parts of time.47 There is even the view that the texts under-
determine a particular account of temporal instants.48 I will address some points relevant to this 
debate toward the end of this section. For the moment, however, I propose to focus on a fresh set 
of considerations that derive from the intriguing suggestion in Spinoza that Descartes is com-
mitted to rejecting an atomistic conception of at least a particular sort of temporal extension. 
This suggestion is found in his 66 summary of Descartes’s Principles, a text that was in fact 
the only one that Spinoza published under his own name. In the scholium to proposition 6 of 
the second part of this text, Spinoza responds to an argument, purportedly from Zeno, against 
 The prominence of Gueroult’s conclusion in the earlier literature is reflected in Yvon Belavel’s re-
mark that “it is common knowledge that for Descartes time is discontinuous” (Leibniz critique de Descartes 
[Paris: Gallimard, 960], 49). There are earlier anticipations of Gueroult’s interpretation in the French 
literature; see, for instance, Jean Vigier, “Les idées du temps, de durée et d’éternité chez Descartes,” Revue 
philosophique 89 (90): 96–, –48, and Jean Wahl, Du role de l’idée de l’instant dans la phi-
losophie de Descartes (Paris: Félix Alcan, 90). For a defense of this conclusion in the recent English-
language literature, see Ken Levy, “Is Descartes a Temporal Atomist?”, British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy  (005): 67–74. 
 Descartes selon l’ordre, :75.
 See the critical discussion of Gueroult in Jean-Marie Beyssade, La philosophie première de 
Descartes (Paris: Flammarion, 979), ch.  and conclusion; and Richard Arthur, “Continuous Creation, 
Continuous Time: A Refutation of the Alleged Discontinuity of Cartesian Time,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 6 (988), 7–75.  See also Jean Laporte, Le rationalisme de Descartes (Paris: Presses Uni-
versitaires de France, 950), 58–60. 
 See, for instance, J. E. K. Secada, “Descartes on Time and Causality,” Philosophical Review 99 (990): 






the consistency of local motion.49 The argument is that the concept of such motion is contradic-
tory because in the case of the circular motion with the greatest speed, the points of the circle 
will remain in the same place, and thus be at rest. Spinoza observes that this argument assumes 
both that there can be a circular motion with the greatest speed, and that “time is composed 
of moments, just as others have conceived that quantity is composed of indivisible points.” The 
greatest speed would be simply that which occurs in an indivisible moment. However, Spinoza 
rejects the assumption that there can be a greatest speed on the grounds that “our intellect finds 
a contradiction in conceiving a motion so fast that there cannot be a faster one, no matter how 
short its course may be” (G :9). In defending this claim, he appeals to the case of the motion 
of a wheel ABC connected by a belt to another wheel DEF half its size (see Figure ). No matter 
how fast ABC is moving, DEF must move twice as fast. Thus, there will be no case in which ABC 
moves with the greatest speed. And since for any wheel there could be a wheel half its size with 
motion that is correlated with the motion of the larger wheel, this argument will work for the 
motion of any wheel whatsoever (G :94). 
Figure 
 This argument does not in fact correspond to any of Zeno’s arguments against motion reported in 
ancient sources; cf. the texts pertaining to Zeno’s arguments in G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, 
eds., The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 98, nd edn.), ch. IX). 
Perhaps the argument is one that Spinoza constructed on the basis of principles that he took to be central 
to Zeno’s actual arguments.





The argument against the assumption that time is composed of indivisible moments de-
pends on the conception of time as “the measure of motion.”50 Since any portion of the distance 
a body travels is divisible into parts, “the time by which that motion is measured will also be 
divisible, and the duration of that motion, or time, will be divisible, and this to infinity, q.e.d.” 
(G :94). Admittedly, so expressed the argument is not entirely in line with Descartes’s own 
official position. For instance, we have seen that Descartes was concerned to distinguish time, 
as a “mode of thinking,” from the duration that cannot be conceived apart from the enduring 
object.5 Moreover, the claim that spatial and temporal extensions are divisible “to infinity” does 
not respect his official distinction of the infinite from the indefinite.5 Nonetheless, it does seem 
that Descartes could accept the argument that insofar as the distance a body travels must be 
indefinitely divisible, so also must the duration of the motion of that body. For the duration can 
be mapped onto the distance, with portions of the distance corresponding to portions of the 
duration of the motion over that distance. As there is no smallest distance of the motion, so 
there will be no smallest part of the duration of that motion (see Figure ).5
0 Cf. Descartes’s claim in the Principles that time considered apart from duration is “called the me-
asure of motion” and involves the comparison of the duration of an object with the “most regular motions 
that give rise to years and days” (PP I.57, AT 8-:7). Aristotle of course had defined time as the “number 
of motion”; see Physics, bk. IV, ch. , 0a5, in Complete Works, :7. 
 Though Spinoza is well aware of this distinction; see his claim in the Cogitata Metaphysica 
appended to his summary of Descartes’s Principles that time “is not an affection of things, but only a 
mere mode of thinking, or, as we have already said, a being of reason” (G :44).
 But see Descartes’s own claim in correspondence that “there is no quantity that is not divisible into 
an infinity [une infinité] of parts; and force, motion, percussion, etc., are species of quantity” (To Mersenne, 
 Mar. 640, AT :6).
 In his own response to Zeno’s Achilles paradox, Descartes insists on the fact that a finite quantity 
can be composed of infinitely (sic) many parts (To Clerselier, June/July 646, AT 4:445–47; the argument is 
repeated in To Mersenne, 7 Sept. 646, AT 4:499–500). Though he focuses here on the distance of the race, 








According to this argument, then, the indefinite divisibility of the duration of motion de-
rives from the fact that this motion has an indefinitely divisible spatial extent. In the Principles, 
however, Descartes insists that “the duration that we understand to be involved in motion is no 
different from the duration involved in things that do not move” (PP I.57, AT 8-:7). By “things 
that do not move,” he apparently intends to include bodies at rest, for he provides as an exam-
ple of the point the fact that the duration of two bodies does not differ simply in virtue of the 
fact that one is moving more quickly than another.54 Although this example does not concern 
explicitly the case of resting bodies, his view, presumably, is that just as a body has the same sort 
of duration whether its motion is swift or slow, so it has the same sort of duration whether it is 
in motion or at rest. 
There remains the case, so prominent in the Third Meditation, of the duration of the 
mind. This case is addressed explicitly in the correspondence with Arnauld that I cited previ-
ously. In the letter that initiated the exchange, Arnauld objects to the claim in the Third Medi-
tation that the duration of his mind is divisible into “innumerably many” parts. He appeals in 
particular to the view of “the philosophers and theologians” that “a permanent and maximally 
 In a passage from his correspondence with Arnauld considered presently, Descartes indicates that 
he also intended to include immaterial minds, which not only are not moving but also are not subject to 
motion (or rest).





spiritual thing, such as the mind … has a duration that is permanent and tota simul (which 
the duration of God certainly is), and consequently not possessing those parts, the earlier of 
which do not depend on the later.” In this view, the simultaneous and indivisible duration of 
pure spirits must differ in nature from the divisible duration of motion, “which alone is time in 
a proper sense.” Arnauld notes that given the assumption in the Third Meditation that there is 
no material world, and hence no real motion, the only duration that could be at issue in this text 
would be the permanent duration of pure spirits. But then, he concludes, those who accept the 
common view must deny that this duration is divisible into distinct parts (Arnauld to Descartes, 
 June 648, AT 5:88–89).
Descartes responds that this line of objection “rests on the scholastic opinion … with 
which I differ greatly.”55 He cites in particular his claim in the Principles that the duration of 
objects in motion is the same as the duration of objects that do not move. But he adds that “even 
if no bodies existed, it still could not be said that the duration of the human mind was tota simul 
like the duration of God” since “our thoughts display a successiveness that in no way can be 
admitted in divine thoughts” (To Arnauld, 4 July 648, AT 5:9). When Arnauld questions in a 
subsequent letter “whence the before and after, which must be found in all succession, is to be 
selected in the successive duration of things not in motion” (Arnauld to Descartes, July 648, AT 
5:5), Descartes replies that “the before and after of any duration is known to me in no other 
way than by the before and after of the successive duration that I detect in my own thought, 
with which other things co-exist (To Arnauld, 9 July 648, AT 5:). 
Jean-Marie Beyssade has appealed to these remarks to Arnauld in support of the conclu-
sion that Descartes takes reflection on our own thought to reveal that duration in general is 
indefinitely divisible.56 But though the remarks seem to me to provide a solid textual basis for 
 For more on the scholastic opinion and its relation to Descartes’s views, see Jean-Robert Armo-
gathe, “Les sources scolastiques du temps cartésien: elements d’un debat,” Revue internationale de philo-
sophie 7 (98): 6–6; and Jean-Luc Solère, “Decartes et les discussions médiévales sur le temps,” in J. 
Biard and R. Rashed, eds., Descartes et le moyen âge (Paris: J. Vrin, 997), 9–48. See also the discus-
sion below of the scholastic account of the temporality of angelic thought in Thomas and Suárez. 
 La philosophie première, 4–4. But cf. Wahl’s claim that for Descartes the recognition of the 
truth of the cogito proposition requires “an instantaneous certitude, a judgment, a reasoning gathered 






Beyssade’s conclusion, we still require some argument for the claim that the duration of thought 
must have this sort of divisibility. As Arnauld noted, after all, divine thought can be entirely tota 
simul, and thus lack any sort of succession. And even if finite thought must involve some sort 
of succession, it is not immediately obvious that this successive duration must be composed of 
parts that themselves possess a divisible temporal extension.
Certainly Descartes is committed to holding that spatial extension is composed of parts 
that have a divisible spatial extension. Thus, he argues in correspondence that since body is just 
“a thing that length, breadth and extension,” it cannot be composed of indivisible parts insofar 
as “an indivisible thing cannot have any length, breadth or depth” (To Mersenne, 8 Oct 640, 
AT :–4). In his view, the parts of spatial extension must either have such an extension, 
and so be divisible, or else have no spatial extension at all, and so be incapable of constituting 
something with spatial extent.57 If this same argument can be applied to temporal extension, 
we would have the result that temporal extension cannot be composed of temporally indivis-
ible parts. And indeed, some of Descartes’s followers did attempt to apply the argument in this 
manner. For instance, we find the French Cartesian Pierre-Sylvain Regis (also Régis) claimed 
in a 704 text that to compose temporal duration of indivisible instants “is the same thing as to 
compose a number of nullities.”58 
This argument against indivisible temporal instants assumes that in the case of temporal 
extension the choice is between that which has temporal extension and that which has no exist-
ence at all. However, Descartes’s remarks to Arnauld indicate that the choice is rather between 
successive thought with distinct parts, on the one hand, and non-successive thought that is tota 
simul, on the other. Thus, to compose temporal extension of instants that are themselves non-
successive would not necessarily, pace Regis, be to compose it of nullities. To be sure, if Descartes 
 Cf. the argument in Arnauld and Nicole’s Cartesian text, Logique ou l’Art de penser, that if the 
parts that compose extension themselves are extended, “then they are divisible, and they have several 
parts,” whereas if they do not have extension, ”they therefore have zero extension, and hence it is im-
possible for them to form an extension” (pt. IV, ch. , in Logic or the Art of Thinking, trans. J. Buroker 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 996], ).
 Usage de la raison et de la foi, ed. J.-R. Armogathe (Paris: Fayard, 996), bk. I-, ch. 7, ; em-
phasis in original. Cf. the claim of Malebranche, cited in note 74, that the same argument against atomic 
parts of matter rules out atomic parts of time.





held that only an infinite mind could think tota simul, then given the exhaustive nature of the 
distinction between successive and simultaneous thought, he could say that any finite thought 
must be successive. But though Descartes perhaps has reason to deny that the thought of a fi-
nite mind could be entirely tota simul, it is not clear that he has reason to deny that such a mind 
could have individual thoughts that themselves involve no succession. 
Indeed, we can look to the “scholastic opinion” with which Descartes takes issue in 
his correspondence with Arnauld for a possible conception of finite thought constituted of 
different individual thoughts that are tota simul. For instance, Thomas Aquinas claimed that 
though all embodied human thought is discursive, and thus involves temporal change, the 
cognition of disembodied angels involves an instantaneous intellectual grasp of principles 
and all of their consequences.59 He further distinguished this instantaneous intellectual act 
from divine cognition in two ways. First, he noted that angelic cognition does not compre-
hend everything at once, and thus has a limited content,60 and secondly, he suggested that 
an angelic intellect can have distinct instantaneous acts of cognition.6  Both differences from 
divine cognition are reflected in Suárez’s later view that angelic cognition is composed of a 
series of non-discursive “angelic instants” (instantia angelica) that can be measured by a sort 
of “discrete time” (tempus discretum).6 
 See Summa Theologiae, pt. I, quest. 58, art.  (Ed. Blackfriars [New York: McGraw-Hill, 964–8]). 
For more on medieval debates concerning the temporality of angelic thought, see Pasquale Porro, “Angelic 
Measures: Aevum and Discrete Time,” in P. Porro, ed., The Medieval Concept of Time: The Scholastic 
Debate and Its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 00), –59.
0 For Thomas’s view of divine cognition, see Summa Theologiae, pt. I, quest. 4, art. 7. Elsewhere 
Thomas indicates that whereas God understands everything through a single object, namely, his own 
essence, angelic intellects have a more limited understanding that depends on distinct intellectual “spe-
cies”; see, for instance, ibid., pt. I, quest. 55, art., and quest. 87, art. . 
 This suggestion is found in his claim that since the act by which an angel merits beatitude could 
not exist simultaneously with the act of beatitude itself, “it is necessary to suppose a diversity of instants, 
in one of which the angel merited beatitude, and in another was beatified” (Summa Theologiae, pt. I, 
quest. 6, art. 7, ad ).
 Disputationes, disp. L, §7, ¶¶8–0, :947–48. For a consideration of Suárez’s view of discrete time, 
see my Radical Cartesianism: The French Reception of Descartes (New York: Cambridge University 






In the Conversation with Burman, Descartes is reported to have complained that the 
work of Thomas, the so-called “Angelic Doctor,” is nowhere “more pointless” (ineptior) than in 
his speculations concerning the distinctive nature of angels, since “the cognition of angels is 
virtually concealed from us when we do not draw it from our mind” (AT 5:57).  On this point, 
there is a perfect match with his own writings. For in correspondence Descartes begs off provid-
ing a definitive response to the question of whether angels sense by claiming that “I never de-
termine that for which I have no certain reason, and I never allow room for conjecture” (To More, 
Aug. 649, AT 5:40). Yet the issue for us is not whether Thomas or Suárez can establish that dis-
embodied intellects in fact possess non-successive thoughts, but whether it is even intelligible 
to suppose that there could be a finite thought that does not itself involve temporal succession, 
but is tota simul. Insofar as Descartes has not shown that any such thought is unintelligible, he 
cannot claim that the duration of any finite mind must be divisible without limit.6 
There is still Descartes’s conclusion in the Third Meditation that he could not exist at any 
moment unless “some cause as it were creates” him at that moment, a cause that he ultimately 
identifies with God.64  To be sure, Gueroult, among others, has understood this conclusion to 
commit Descartes to the view that there are discrete indivisible moments at which God re-cre-
ates any object he conserves.65 But it is significant that Descartes claims in the Third Meditation 
only that something quasi creates him anew. Moreover, he appeals in the Fifth Replies to the 
 Secada has insisted that claims concerning the indefinite (or, as he puts it, infinite) divisibility of 
time commit Descartes only to the density of duration and not to its continuity, with the difference being 
that only the latter precludes indivisible parts (“Descartes on Time,” 65–66). If Descartes assumed that 
the duration of his mind could have indivisible parts, however, it is not clear why he would have insisted 
that this duration must be divisible into parts without any conceivable limit. Surely the indivisible parts 
would provide the limit to the divisibility, even if there were uncountably many of them. 
 See Descartes admission in the First Replies that conservation can in no way come from any se-
condary cause, but “altogether from that in which there is such great power that as it conserves a thing 
external to itself, so much the more it conserves itself by its own power, and thus is a se” (AT 7:). For 
Descartes, of course, only God has the supreme perfection required to derive existence from himself.
 Gueroult, Descartes selon l’ordre, :74–76. Following Henri Bergson, Gueroult labels this the 
“cinematographic” reading of Descartes’s account of conservation (ibid., 74). See the similar interpreta-
tion in Etienne Gilson’s commentary on the Discours de la Méthode (Paris: J. Vrin, 95), 40–4, and 
in Norman Kemp Smith’s New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes (London: Macmillan, 95), 0. 





view, which “all metaphysicians admit as manifest,” that conservation is “the continued influx 
[continuo influxi] of the first cause” (AT 7:69), and in the Discourse on the Method he en-
dorses the “opinion commonly accepted among the theologians” that “the act by which God 
now conserves [the world] is entirely the same [toute la meme] as that by which he has created 
it” (AT 6:45).66 The indication here is that divine conservation consists not in continuous re-crea-
tion, but rather, as Suárez himself had emphasized previously, in a continuation of God’s initial 
act of creation.67
Given this understanding of conservation, however, Descartes may seem to have an argu-
ment for the conclusion that the temporal extension of any created entity is indefinitely divisible. 
As Richard Arthur has expressed it, the argument is that since “any thing has duration or exists 
only as long as it is being created or produced by God,” and since that creation or production is 
continuous, “then the duration of each created thing must likewise be continuous.”68 Insofar as 
continuity requires indefinite divisibility, there appears to be reason for Descartes to claim that 
the duration of any created thought must be divisible into indefinitely many parts. 
Descartes’s doctrine of conservation as continued creation certainly requires the con-
tinuing production of the object with its attribute of duration. What it does not clearly dictate, 
however, is that the modes of this attribute must themselves be composed of indefinitely many 
distinct modal parts. For God’s continued creation could result in a mind that has a succession 
of individually non-successive thoughts. Indeed, though Suárez was a prominent scholastic 
proponent of the doctrine of conservation as continued creation, we have seen that he insisted 
on the fact that angelic cognition occurs in a discrete rather than a continuous time. For Suárez, 
then, divine conservation of the angelic intellect consists in a continued production of some-
thing that is the subject of acts that are themselves discontinuous. 
 In the Fifth Replies, Descartes illustrates his view of conservation by drawing on a passage from 
Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae that includes the conclusion that God conserves “by a continu-
ation of that action whereby he gives being” (pt. I, qu. 04, art. , ad obj. 4). Suárez later defended the 
conclusion that the conservation of the being of the object differs only “in connotation” (connotatione) 
from the initial creation of that object ex nihilo (Disputationes, disp. XXI, §, ¶, :79). 
 For this view in Suárez, see note 66.






Admittedly, Descartes’s claim in the correspondence with Arnauld that our mental life 
does not involve anything akin to the tota simul of divine thought is introspectively quite 
plausible. Nor is it any less plausible to deny that our thought involves something akin to the 
angelic instants that Suárez posited. Gueroult himself allows that Descartes takes our dura-
tion to appear to be continuous when we consider it from “the point of view of created things, 
or in the abstract.”69 As we have seen, however, Gueroult also insists that what is primary for 
Descartes is the “point of view of creation and of the concrete,” from which time is seen to be 
composed of indivisible instants. His main evidence that Descartes privileged the concrete 
view is drawn—ironically enough, given Spinoza’s discussion in his summary of Descartes’s 
Principles—from “the whole Cartesian conception of motion.” In particular, Gueroult claims 
that Descartes embraced a “static” conception of motion that is reflected most clearly in his 
insistence that light is transmitted in an atemporal “instant.” 70 Thus, whereas from our own 
psychological perspective time seems to be continuous, the case of motion is supposed to 
show that it is really discontinuous.
Gueroult’s brief is not convincing. For one thing, Descartes himself emphasizes in the 
Principles that “the power of light consists not in some duration of motion, but rather in the 
pressure or preparation for motion” (PP III.64, AT 8-:5), which pressure or preparation de-
rives from the tendency of bodies in a vortex to move in a straight line.7 Thus, the transmission 
of light can be instantaneous since it is not itself a motion but only a result of the “prepara-
tion for” motion. In the same passage, moreover, Descartes notes that bodies in perpetual mo-
tion have a particular configuration that “can endure only through the minimum point of time, 
which they call an instant, and therefore the continuation [continuitatem] of their motion is not 
interrupted” (AT 8-:5). Here the instantaneous states, far from precluding continuous mo-
tion, are said to be required for it.7 
 In what follows I draw on my discussion of Gueroult’s position in “The Cartesian Refutation of 
Idealism,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 0 (00): 5–40. 
0 Descartes selon l’ordre, :94–95.
 See PP III.55–60, AT 8-:08–. 
 Cf. Arthur’s conclusion that Descartes needs to appeal to instantaneous states of a moving body 
“to give a consistent analysis of continuous motion and duration without the concepts of the calculus” 





Even though Gueroult’s argument that Descartes is committed by “the whole Cartesian 
conception of motion” to temporal discontinuity is untenable, I think it still must be conceded 
that the claim in the Third Meditation that our mental life is divisible into distinct parts does not 
itself preclude the position that these parts are themselves indivisible. What the claim strictly 
requires is only that the parts are independent in the sense that one can be actual without the 
others being so. But then the doctrine that our conservation is not distinct from our creation at 
each moment does not itself entail the conclusion that created thought must have an indefi-
nitely divisible temporal duration.
So far, Descartes is left without a firm basis for this conclusion. It is difficult to see how he 
could construct an argument for the conclusion that is analogous to the argument that Spinoza 
offered on his behalf for the continuity of the duration of motion.7  Admittedly, the fact that 
there is such a difficulty does not suffice to establish that he cannot take indefinitely divisible 
succession to be essential to created thought as such. By the same token, however, it is fair to 
request an argument for the relatively strong assumption that the duration of such thought 
requires not just succession, but a succession that happens to match the indefinitely divisible 
succession of the duration of motion. The more temporal extension is detached from spatial 
extension, the less bright the prospects for such an argument seem to be.74
(“Continuous Creation, Continuous Time,” 7).
 Regis later explained the unlimited divisibility of the duration of our thought by appealing to the 
essential dependence on motion (Usage, Bk. I-, ch. 6, 07). On this point Regis followed his fellow 
French Cartesian Robert Desgabets, who argued that the continuous nature of the duration of our thou-
ght derives from a “union with motion”; see Desgabets’s Supplément to Descartes’s Meditations, in Dom 
Robert Desgabets: Œuvres philosophique inédites, ed. J. Beaude (Amsterdam: Quadratures, 98–85), 
5:90. However, both Desgabets and Regis were taking issue with the view in Descartes that consciou-
sness reveals purely intellectual thoughts in us that have a temporal duration but have no relation to 
motion. For further discussion of this critique of Descartes in Desgabets and Regis, see my Radical Carte-
sianism, ch. 4.  
 The fact that Descartes has less difficulty establishing the indefinite divisibility of duration in the case of 
material objects than he has in the case of minds seems to support the conclusion of Malebranche that the na-
ture of body is better known to him than the nature of mind. This conclusion was itself a critique of Descartes’s 
own official position in the Second Meditation that the nature of mind “is better known than body” (AT 7:). 







We began with the distinction, which the Conversation with Burman attributes to Des-
cartes, between the divisibility of something that is extended by nature, on the one hand, and 
the divisibility of the duration of something that is indivisible by nature, on the other. I hope to 
have shown that this distinction can be explained in terms of the further distinction deriving 
from Descartes’s own writings between the divisibility of res extensa into substantial parts and 
the divisibility of the temporal duration of res cogitans, as well as of res extensa, into modal parts. 
It is because Descartes holds the duration of the res cogitans to be only modally divisible that 
he can remain confident that thought itself is unextended and indivisible in its nature, that is to 
say, substantially indivisible.
We have discovered reasons to doubt the reliability of the report in the Conversation 
that Descartes takes God’s duration as well as our own to be divisible into “an infinity of parts.” 
It is possible to bring this claim into line with Descartes’s own official views by substituting 
‘indefinitely many’ for ‘an infinity of’ and by restricting the claim to created duration. But we do 
not thereby explain why any sort of created duration must be indefinitely divisible into parts. 
Spinoza proposes on Descartes’s behalf an explanation in the case of the duration of motion 
by appealing to the connection to the spatial extent of the motion itself. As Beyssade observes, 
however, Descartes himself emphasizes in his correspondence with Arnauld an understanding 
of duration that derives from “the before and after of the successive duration that I detect in my 
own thought” (AT 5:). The problem is that the indefinite modal divisibility of the temporal 
extension of his thought simply is not evident for Descartes in the way in which the indefinite 
substantial divisibility of spatial extension is. Not that the indefinite substantial divisibility of 
spatial extension is entirely unproblematic for him; indeed, we have considered the Spinozistic 
argument from his own claims regarding the real distinction to the substantial indivisibility of 
this extension. But at least Descartes has a conception of spatial extension that supports his 
claim that this extension must be divisible into indefinitely many substantial parts. In contrast, 
of the Soul: A Cartesian Interpretation (New York: Oxford, 996). Malebranche was unable to appeal to this 
consideration regarding duration in support of his critique of Descartes, however, given his own assumption 
that there can no more be a smallest part of duration than there can be a smallest part of matter; see Recherche 
de la vérité, pt. I, ch. 8, in Œuvres complètes de Malebranche, ed. A. Robinet (Paris: J. Vrin, 958–84), :04.





his conception of thinking substance provides no obvious support for the conclusion that his 
thought must have a duration that is divisible into indefinitely many modal parts. Descartes had 
more reason than he apparently realized to insist on the distinction in the Conversation between 
the temporal extension of our thought and the spatial extension of what is divisible with respect 
to its very nature.75
RESUMO
Nesse artigo pretendo examinar a distinção atribuída a Descartes, em Conversações com Burman, entre, de 
um lado, a divisibilidade de algo que é por natureza extenso e, de outro, a divisibilidade da duração de algo que 
é por natureza indivisível. Pretendo mostrar que essa distinção pode ser explicada em termos de uma outra dis-
tinção que deriva dos escritos do próprio Descartes, entre a divisibilidade da res extensa em partes substanciais 
e a divisibilidade da duração temporal da res cogitans e da res extensa em partes modais.
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